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FLEXICURITY – LABOUR MARKET 





Unemployment is at a low and stable level in Denmark. This achievement is often attributed 
to the so-called flexicurity model combining flexible hiring and firing rules for employers 
with income security for employees. Whatever virtues this model may have, a low and stable 
unemployment rate is not automatically among them since the basic flexicurity properties 
were also in place during the 1970s and 1980s where high and persistent unemployment was 
prevalent. Labour market performance has changed due to a series of reforms during the 
1990s, the main thrust of which were a shift from a passive focus of labour market policies to 
a more active focus on job search and employment. The policy tightened eligibility for 
unemployment benefits and their duration as well as introduced workfare elements into 
unemployment insurance and social policies in general. Thereby policy makers attempted to 
strengthen the incentive structure without taking resort to general benefit reductions. We 
argue that the workfare policies have played an important role running primarily via 
motivation/threat and wage effects. However, active labour market policies are resource 
demanding, and although the workfare reforms have improved cost effectiveness, there is still 
an issue as to whether the resources going into active labour market policies are used 
efficiently. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The so-called flexicurity model has recently attracted much attention, and Denmark is often 
highlighted as the prime example of this particular mix of a flexible labour market with a generous 
social security system. The macro performance in Denmark in recent years, and in particular the 
significant reduction in unemployment, cf. Figure 1, has fuelled an interest in the flexicurity model.  
 

























Source: OECD.  
 
Discussions in Europe on labour market issues are increasingly organized under the heading of 
flexicurity, and the EU Commission is preparing a green book on flexicurity to set out some 
common principles for the EU member countries. The widespread and broad use of the term 
flexicurity has, however, implied that it has developed into a positively charged concept embracing 
all nice things about labour market outcomes, and hence the term ceases to be useful. To structure 
the debate, one can interpret the concept in two different ways. One is broad, seeing it as a question 
of finding a balance between the flexibility needed for firms in adjusting their labour input and the 
quest for security for workers, or in economics jargon between incentives and insurance or 
efficiency and equity. Another is specific, taking it to be a particular policy as e.g. found in 
Denmark which is considered attractive. The latter interpretation often leads to a “copy and paste” 
discussion on the scope for transferring this particular policy mix to other countries. On this basis, 
strong claims on labour market policies are often made like “Protecting jobs with employment 
legislation is definitely detrimental to employment, whereas protecting workers with unemployment 
insurance is potentially useful for employment” (Sapir (2005)).  
 
In this paper, we argue that the “copying and paste” discussion is naïve and based both on an 
incomplete reading of the Danish experience and a neglect of policy complementarities. However, 
at the more general level concerning how to strike a balance between incentives and insurance, we 
will argue that the Danish experience includes interesting lessons of both failure and success which 
are of interest for policy discussions and designs in other countries.  
 
The short version of the Danish story is the following. Hiring and firing rules are rather flexible, 
and the unemployment insurance scheme is generous by international standards. However, this was 
also the case in the period from the mid 1970s to the early part of the 1990s, where Denmark was   3
routinely listed as a crises country with problems for almost any macroeconomic indicator, 
including high and persistent unemployment. Therefore, the flex and the security part of the Danish 
policy package cannot in isolation account for the drop in unemployment. This is not denying that 
these parts have attractive implications, but it points out that they are no guarantee for a low and 
stable unemployment rate. To account for the Danish experience, a series of reforms during the 
1990s are important. The main thrust of these was a shift from a passive focus of labour market 
policies to a more active focus on job search and employment. The policy tightened eligibility for 
unemployment benefits and their duration as well as introduced workfare elements into 
unemployment insurance and social policies in general. The shift in policy and labour market 
performance is also to be seen in perspective of macroeconomic developments which contributed to 
an up-turn in economic activity, and thereby also to the political support for the changes. 
 
The term flexicurity is therefore in some sense a misnomer for the “Danish” model. When the 
model was a pure flexicurity model resting only on the two legs of flexibility and security, it 
performed badly and public transfers tended to be an absorbing state. The unemployment rate 
reached 10 %, and the fraction of the age group 15-66 receiving public transfers increased from 
about 10 % in 1970 to 30 % in the early 1990s. The social safety net thus served to protect incomes, 
but not to bring unemployed back into employment, which had dramatic consequences for public 
finances. The model came to function better when it was balanced with the third leg – active labour 
market policies – having a clear focus on job search and employment, cf. Figure 2. Prior to the 
reforms, the welfare system was essentially a passive player between firms benefiting from 
flexibility and workers from income security. As is often seen in such tripartite relations, the 
passive player carries all the disadvantages. When a more active approach was taken in labour 
market policies, it was possible to strengthen employment while maintaining flexibility and income 
security.  
 




It is also important to note that a very different picture emerges if one turns from open 
unemployment to measures of gross unemployment, i.e. shifting perspective from the available pool 
of unemployed searching for a job to the implications of non-employment among the working age 












on those actively searching for a job, and the gross rate calculated as the sum of open 
unemployment and people in activation, early retirement and the like. First, it is seen that there was 
some spread between the official and search unemployment rates in the 1980s into the 1990s, 
suggesting that the system was rather lax in this period. Second, the gross unemployment rate has 
risen primarily due to an early retirement scheme and activation measures. Finally, although the 
registered unemployment rate is back to the level at the onset of the oil crisis in the 1970s, this is 
not so for the gross rate, and the gap between the two has only been marginally reduced. The latter 
shows that a major transfer burden still remains on public finances. 
  
























































































Gross unemployment Registrered unemployment
Search unemployment
 
Note: Search unemployment is based on survey data and is measuring unemployed actively searching for a job, the gross unemployment rate equals 
the registered unemployment rate plus people in activation, paid leave schemes and early retirement.  
Source: Calculations based on data from Statistics Denmark. 
 
The Danish discussion and experience bring interesting insights on how to strengthen labour market 
incentives under tight distributional constraints. Denmark has an extended welfare state with a 
tightly knit social safety net and a high level of public service provisions, all of which are tax 
financed. Labour market policies and institutions are an integral part of the welfare state. The 
Danish welfare model is based on ambitious egalitarian objectives, and a strengthening of the 
incentive structure by general reductions in various benefits included in the social safety net is not a 
possible policy avenue. Working poor is not a policy option. At the same time, it is important to 
note that an extended tax financed welfare state presupposes that a large fraction of the population 
is in employment. Thus, for the model to be financially viable, the employment rate must be high. 
The reason is simple; when losing their job, most people have an entitlement to some income 
support, and at the same time, their tax payments are lowered. It is therefore no surprise that 
Denmark (and the other Scandinavian Countries) have a high labour force participation rate. To put 
it differently, the welfare model is employment focussed. The critical and challenging issue is how 
to strike a balance between the social/distributional objectives and the need to maintain a high 
employment ratio. This balance was lost in the 1970s and 1980s, but the reform process since the 
mid-1990s has contributed to re-establish it. 
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The paper is organised as follows: We start out in Section 2 by considering characteristics of the 
Danish labour market often associated with the flexicurity model and how these are supposed to 
affect labour market outcomes. Since the main policy change in Denmark is related to the third leg 
of the Danish model – workfare policies – the following sections take a closer look at active labour 
market policies and their effects in Denmark.  A short introduction to Danish labour and social 
policies are given in Section 3 as a prelude to the discussion of the reform process in Section 4. In 
Section 5, we turn to the issue of how workfare policies have contributed to the shift in labour 
market performance in Denmark, and Section 6 offers some policy lessons from the Danish 
experience. 
 
2. Danish flexicurity – a model or an outlier? 
 
In cross-country comparisons, Denmark stands out as having rather liberal EPL and a relatively 
generous unemployment insurance scheme, and for this reason, Denmark is often seen as a 
“flexicurity”-country.  The cross-country evidence presented in Figure 4 does not support the usual 
perception that lax EPL and a generous IU-system are substitutes in policy packages. It is more 
appropriate to distinguish between “low” security countries with lax EPL and non-generous UI, and 
“high” security countries with strict EPL and generous UI. In the latter group, Denmark stands out, 
being a country with one of the most generous UI-systems, but a relatively lax EPL.  
 




















































Note: Indicator for EPL is measured on a scale from 0 to 4 in 2003, and the replacement rate measures the average ratio of benefits to wages 
calculated as an average over 5 years. The dotted lines indicate the median values of the two indicators. 
Source: OECD Database and OECD (2004)  
 
 
In a number of respects, standard perceptions on flexicurity do not match experience from 
Denmark. It is often hypothesized that a flexicurity system like the Danish is bound to lead to large 
employment variability, leaving it to the UI-system to cushion the consequences of these   6
fluctuations. Judging job security by lengths of job tenure, one finds it to be relatively low in 
Denmark, but this can partly be explained by an industry structure with relatively many small firms 
and a relatively low average retirement age. More interestingly, employment variability seen 
relative to output variability is not high in Denmark, cf. Figure 5, i.e. the Danish system does not 
cause “excessive” employment volatility.  
 



































Note: Calculated as the standard deviation of employment growth relative to the standard deviation of real gdp growth for the period 1970-2006 
Source: Own calculations based on data from Gronningen total economy data base 
 
One reason for this may be that even though legal rules are lax, explicit or implicit arrangements 
arise between employers and employees both to protect firm-specific human capital and to diversify 
risk. This is supported by several facts. First, labour productivity (level or growth) is not low in 
Denmark
1.  Second, labour market training is among the highest in OECD (OECD, 2004). Finally, 
the level of temporary lay-offs is high in Denmark, i.e. the attachment to the (previous) employer is 
high even for the unemployed (Danish Economic Council, 2002). 
 
These observations are related to the debate on EPL and labour market performance. It is often 
argued that EPL is conducive to productivity (see Belot et al. (2007)). One argument is that 
productivity is increasing in tenure (due to e.g. learning by doing and firm-specific training), and 
since tenure is also strengthened by EPL, it is inferred that EPL is good for productivity. However, 
the Danish experience does not confirm this, and one reason for this is that implicit contractual 
relations arise in the labour market. It is therefore not obvious that lax EPL is an impediment to 
firm-specific training. Lax EPL means that the firm has an easier option to lay off people, but it will 
normally only want to exercise this option in recessions perceived to be persistent. Moreover, firm-
specific training may lower the outside options for the worker, which, in turn, tends to create a 
locking-in situation. It is therefore more plausible that lax EPL reduces general training/education, 
but not firm-specific training, and therefore the implications for productivity are less clear. 
 
                                                 
1 Average hourly labour productivity is according to calculations by the Gronningen group on par with that in the US. 
Estimates by OECD and Eurostat have that Denmark has a lower average hourly productivity than the US by 5-10 %, 
but it is on par with most European countries.   7
A distinction can be made between job and employment security, where the former refers to 
protecting and maintaining a given job, while the latter relates to remaining employed but possibly 
in a different job (firm, function, location etc.). A system of strict EPL tends to provide job security 
of insiders, whereas a flexicurity system is often portrayed as ensuring employment security. If so, 
the latter should be more conducive to structural changes, which in itself can have beneficial effects 
on employment and productivity.  It is difficult to compare both actual and potential structural 
changes between countries. Figure 6 displays job creation and destruction in Denmark as an 
indicator of the level of structural changes affecting the labour market. It is seen that the level of job 
flows is high with annual job creation and destruction at about 10 %, but this level is found in many 
countries. Note that the two periods with net-job creation (mid 1980s and during the 1990s) are both 
driven by an increase in job creation and a decrease in job destruction, but whereas the first period 
has large amplitude and is short-lived, the later period has smaller amplitudes but is more long-
lived. 
 
















Note:  Based on firm level data covering the entire population of Danish firms. Rikke Ibsen kindly provided the data. 
Source: Danish firm register data, Statistics Denmark. 
 
Strict EPL is often taken to lead to more long-term unemployment, whereas more lax EPL leads to a 
larger share of short-term unemployment.  According to this, Denmark should have a relatively high 
share of short-term unemployment and a corresponding low share of long-term unemployment. As 
seen from Figure 7, there is no strong support for this conjecture. However, the Danish system may 
cause a high level of temporary lay-offs due to the flexible dismissal rules and the generous UI-
system. In an assessment for 1998, it was found that almost 30 % of all unemployment spells are 
followed by rehiring by the initial employer within 4 weeks (40 % within 26 weeks), implying that 
temporary lay-offs accounted for about 10 % of total unemployment (Danish Economic Council, 
2002). 
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short term unemployment Long term unemployment
 
Note: Data applies to 2004. Short-term unemployment is defined as less than three months, and long-term unemployment as more than a year 
Source: Data from OECD database, employment. 
 
 
3.  A short primer on unemployment insurance and social 
  assistance in Denmark 
The unemployment insurance system in Denmark is a variant of the Gent model with UI-funds and 
voluntary individual membership. Contribution rates are determined politically and are the same 
across all UI-funds. The UI-funds are subsidized by the public sector (in a clearly countercyclical 
way). Accordingly, the marginal costs of increasing unemployment are fully tax financed. 
Membership is open to persons with relevant qualifications for the specific UI-fund, or via regular 
work within its area. The unemployment benefit cannot exceed 90 % of the previous wage 
(calculated over the last year) or a given cap (currently about 22.300 euros annually, taxable 
income), and it is indexed to general wage developments
2. The maximum duration of benefits is 4 
years, and the entitlement to benefits can be regained by regular work for at least 6 months within 
the last 36 months. Moreover, certain activation requirements are associated with claiming of 
benefits (see below). When UI-benefits expire, the individual would normally be eligible for social 
assistance – which is also the case for unemployed who are not members of an UI-fund. The social 
assistance scheme is rather complicated since the benefit level among other things depends on age 
and marital status, and in addition, there are various means-tested supplements. It is therefore 
difficult to generalize on the fall in transfer income upon transition from UI-benefits to social 
assistance. A person receiving the maximum unemployment benefit would experience an income 
reduction of 20 – 40 %.  
  
It is an implication of this scheme that the replacement rate is strongly dependent on previous 
income since the cap implies that the 90 % compensation only applies for low income groups. In 
Figure 8, the replacement rate is depicted as a function of income for DK and other selected 
                                                 
2 The current indexing formula is from a law enacted in 1990 (revised 2003) according to which all transfers are 
indexed on the basis of the annual wage increases two years earlier. If the increase is above 2 %, a part of 0,3 % is 
transferred to a fund (satsreguleringspuljen) which is spent on initiatives aiming at improving the conditions for people 
on transfers.   9
countries. It is seen that Denmark stands out by having a high replacement rate for low income 
groups, but not for higher income. Hence, when the Danish UI system is characterized as very 
generous, it has to be made with a proviso, and the flexicurity characterization of Denmark is most 
fitting for low income groups. 
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Note: Replacement rate in unemployment insurance schemes calculated on the basis of daily income, and for single persons in countries where 
benefits are dependent on socio-economic variables. Daily wages are truncated at relevant minimum wage levels (for countries with no legal 
minimum wage the negotiated minimum wages are used).    
Source: Own calculations based on European Commission, MISSOC 2006 and ILO. 
 
 
The duration of unemployment benefit periods has been significantly reduced in recent years (see 
below), but is still with a 4-year period relatively long by international standards, cf. Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9: Duration of unemployment benefits in selected countries 
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Note: In the Netherlands, the extension depends on seniority. 
Source: European Commission, MISSOC 2006. 
   10
 
The transition from UIB to social assistance implies that the scheme has a time profile; that is, 
compensation is falling with the duration of unemployment. However, since the duration of UI-
benefits is long, the time dependence is weak in international comparisons  
 
Although subsidized, there is still a decision for workers to take concerning unemployment 
insurance. Currently, slightly more than 70 % of the employed are members of an UI-fund, and 
analyses have shown that there is a positive relationship between membership and unemployment 
risk as theory would predict (Parson, Lilleør and Tranæs (2003))
 3. The relatively low membership 
rate despite the substantial subsidy can be taken as an indication that the perceived job risk is low 
for a large part of the employed. The flex part of the system is not generating a strong perception of 
risk in the labour market. This is also confirmed by survey analyses showing that the perception of 
labour market risk is particularly low in Denmark compared to other European countries (see 
Parent-Thirion et al. (2007)).  
 
 
4. The  reforms 
 
What may seem as a grand policy reform strategy in retrospect is the outcome of a sequence of 
reforms made in a “trial and error” process. The very same government which undertook rather 
radical supply-oriented labour market reforms actually started out introducing a paid leave scheme
4 
based on the lump of labour fallacy. To see the importance of these reforms, it is useful to turn to 




For many years, the unemployment problem was sought to be solved by demand management 
policies including several devaluations. In 1982, there was a policy shift to a conservative liberal 
government which in different constellations remained in power until 1992.  It made a firm 
commitment to a fixed exchange rate policy and initiated a disinflationary policy which was 
accompanied by a boom lowering unemployment, cf. Figure 1. However, this boom ended rather 
abruptly in 1986/1987 due to high wage increases (9 %) among other things. This happened at a 
time when the level of unemployment was above 8 %, indicating that unemployment was not only 
caused by a lack of demand, it also reflected structural problems in the labour market. This 
incidence came to influence policy making for many subsequent years because this level of wage 
increases would be jeopardizing the credibility of the fixed exchange rate policy, and thus the 
overall macroeconomic policy strategy. This experience induced the social partners to agree on the 
so-called “common declaration” in 1987 committing to ensure wage developments consistent with 
maintaining competitiveness for the Danish economy
5. This declaration can be taken as a signal of 
the social dialogue characterizing labour market developments in Denmark. 
 
                                                 
3 An indication that the UI-system may be providing under-insurance for some groups is seen from the fact that the 
market for private supplementary insurance has been growing in recent years although it is still not quantitatively 
significant (less than 3 % of the workforce has a supplementary income insurance). 
4 A so-called transition scheme (overgangsydelse) was offered unemployed in the age group 50-59 as a step towards 
early retirement by waving the condition to be available for and actively searching jobs. This scheme was abolished in 
1996. 
5 This declaration also included the strive for a build-up of a mandatory occupational pension scheme.   11
It is important to note that the experience in the mid-1980s with a booming economy and falling 
unemployment ending in a wage surge was a lesson on the importance of maintaining medium-term 
objectives and the need to ensure that labour developments do not jeopardize the overall 
macroeconomic strategy, including the fixed exchange rate policy. The subsequent period of 
consolidation came to be known as the “seven bad years” with low growth and persistent high 
unemployment. As concerns the labour market, the mood was pessimistic because unemployment 
remained high, and statements like “we have to learn to live with high unemployment” and “too 
many are chasing too few jobs” were frequently made in the policy debate.  
 
In 1992, there was a shift in government from a minority liberal conservative to a minority social 
democratic government. As noted, the government started by launching additional passive measures 
like a paid leave scheme (soon to be phased out when unemployment started to decline). In 
retrospect, one may interpret the policy shift as a two-handed approach including both demand 
management policies and supply-oriented labour market policies. However, this was not by grand 




In 1993/94, fiscal policy was rather expansionary (according to later estimates, the fiscal impact 
was an increase in GDP growth in the order of 0.5 percentage points in both 1993 and 1994). This 
was in part due to the phasing in of a tax reform which lowered taxation of labour income and 
reduced the tax value of interest rate deductibility and other measures to broaden the tax base. To 
allow for a smooth transition of this change for the housing market, the tax reductions were phased 
in more quickly than the tax increases, i.e. temporarily underfinanced and thus expansionary. At the 
same time, domestic demand started increasing, which in part may be attributed to a shift in 
expectations induced by the expansionary policy. As a consequence, the Danish economy 
experienced a demand driven boom in the mid-1990s which contributed to reduce unemployment.  
 
Later, fiscal policies maintained a more neutral role although discussions on the need to tighten 
fiscal policy to avoid “overheating” of the labour market and a repetition of the 1986/87 experience 
were often made. A fiscal contraction was made in 1998 as it was feared that unemployment had 
been reduced to a level where wage increases would take off. This led to a policy package aiming at 
reducing aggregate demand by both reducing public consumption growth and private consumption 
(via mandatory savings and an increase in the excise duty on private loans). It is noteworthy that the 
intervention was anticipatory in the sense of being based on a fear that the development was on a 
track inconsistent with the fixed exchange rate policy, and therefore an initiative had to be taken 
before problems grew out of hand 
 
Labour market policies 
 
A sequence of reforms initiated in the mid-1990s and refined in later years has radically changed 
the system from having a passive focus on income maintenance to a more active focus on bringing 
unemployed into employment. The main ingredients of the policy changes are: i) a shortening of the 
benefit period , ii) eligibility for benefits can no longer be re-gained by participation in activation 
measures, and iii) implementation of activation requirements (workfare) both in the unemployment 
insurance scheme and in the social assistance scheme. 
   12
The sequence of reforms can be gathered from Figure 10 showing the change in the formal length 
of the benefit period, and its split in a passive and active (workfare) part. Note that the benefit level 
is the same in both the “passive” and “active” period. 
 
Figure 10  Changes to the social security system – eligibility and 
activation periods  
              As of 1 July 2003     
              As of 1 January 2001     
                As of 1 January 2000     
                    As of 1 January 1999     
                      As of 1 January 1998   
                        As of 1 January 1996 
                          As of 1 January 1994 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Year   
       Passive eligibility 
period 
   Activation  period     
Note:  The “right and duty” principle in the activation period was introduced in 1995. As of 2003,
there is no distinction between the two periods.  
Sources: The Danish Ministry of Finance (1999), The Danish Ministry of Labour (2000) and The




The single most important change is that participation in activation measures (job training) no 
longer qualifies for remaining eligible for benefits. Before this change, the passive period was 
effectively open-ended since benefits combined with occasional job training would ensure 
continued eligibility for benefits. As illustrated in Figure 10, the system before the reforms 
effectively implied an infinite benefit period since despite a formal duration of 7 years, a new 
benefit period could be gained by participating in a job-offer scheme. As a consequence, the shift 
from UI-benefits to social assistance seldom occurred for people in the UI-system. After the reform, 
the system is as illustrated in Figure 11.b; the benefit period is shorter, activation is compulsory to 
remain eligible for benefits, and participation does not qualify for fulfilling the employment criteria 
to remain eligible for UI benefits, i.e. the transition from UI-benefits to social assistance (also 
associated with activation requirements) is a real option. The time profile of compensation offered 
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The shift in labour market policy from a passive to an active focus was launched by appealing to a 
so-called “right and duty” principle. The argument being that the individual, on the one hand, has a 
right to income support, but, on the other hand, also a duty to actively search for jobs and being 
willing to work. At the same time, society has a right to demand something from recipients of 
income transfers, but also a duty to help improving job prospects. This can be interpreted as 
reflecting that the welfare state builds on reciprocity and work norms, cf. below.  The “right and 
duty” principle was initially only applying to the UI-system, but in 1998, it was extended to also 
apply to social assistance.   
  
The political constraint that labour market incentives are not to be improved via general reductions 
in benefits has one important exception, namely, the youth unemployment programme enacted in 
1996 and later extended. The basic idea of the programme was twofold, namely, to shorten transfer 
duration and to strengthen economic incentives to educate. The background was a high youth 
unemployment rate and the fact that young people to an increasing degree were in long-term 
positions depending on transfers (mainly social assistance) at the same time as the economic 
incentive to undertake education was low (social assistance exceeded study grants). The youth 
unemployment programme addressed both of these problems. The programme introduced 
mandatory activation of all young unemployed below the age of 25 with labour market relevant 
education after 6 months of unemployment. The activation could be an education programme with a 
duration of at least 18 months, possibly in the ordinary education system. At the same time, social 
assistance was lowered to the level of the study grant. The programme was in a sequence of steps 
extended to include all young and to have mandatory activation after no more than 13 weeks. In 
2003, the age group 25-29 was also included in the scheme although this group does not face a 
lower compensation. 
 
EPL and flexibility 
 
Denmark has a long tradition of flexible dismissal rules. Since the end of the 1980s, the only change 
to the Danish employment protection rules has been in relation to temporary employment contracts. 
Thus, more employment categories have been allowed to use temporary employment contracts. 
There are no longer limitations on how often the temporary contracts can be renewed, and there are 











































(a) Pre-reforms  Benefits Benefits
Benefits less 
disutility of  
activation 
requirement   14
temporary employment in Denmark is relatively limited (only about 8 % of total employment), it is 
difficult to attribute a major role to this shift in accounting for the decline in the aggregated 
unemployment.   
 
In other dimensions, there have been important changes. One is that employers have obtained more 
flexibility in varying working time; that is, an average condition applies in the sense that daily and 
weekly working hours are allowed to vary within certain bounds as long as the average working 
hours over a certain period is in accordance with negotiated working hours. 
 
Wage formation has traditionally been centralized but shifted during the 1980s towards an 
intermediate level of centralization. Calmfors et al. (2001) report an index
6 for 
centralization/coordination of the bargaining system taking both horizontal and vertical elements 
into account and find that for Denmark, it has dropped from 0.64 for the period 1973-77 to 0.47 for 
1983-87 and 0.34 for 1993-97. With the increased decentralization of wage formation, it is natural 
that there have been changes in wage systems in the labour market in the sense that more workers 
are now employed under a wage system allowing local and individual variations in wages, and 
fewer workers are under the traditional wage system implying a centrally stipulated wage.   
 
5.  Workfare – does it work? 
 
The popularity that workfare policies seem to have among policy makers is not quite matched by 
the more hesitant support found in both the theoretical and empirical literature on the effects of 
workfare policies on unemployment. In the following, we first present some theoretical 
considerations in order to explain the traditional ambiguous views on the effects of workfare, and to 
point to an often neglected effect which may be crucial for the overall effects of workfare policies 
on labour market performance. The theoretical analysis is also useful in identifying key dimensions 
of workfare policies to be considered empirically. We then briefly describe workfare policies in 
Denmark before turning to empirical evidence from Denmark which is related to both the 
theoretical considerations and the international empirical literature. 
 
5.1.  Workfare in theory 
 
In the following, we present the thrust of a theoretical model bringing together the main channels 
through which workfare may affect labour market outcomes. This section draws on the theoretical 
model analysed in Andersen and Svarer (2007). 
 
Workfare is here understood as some activation programme in which participation is a precondition 
for remaining eligible for unemployment benefits or social assistance. It is useful to consider this 
type of policy in two dimensions, namely, the work requirement associated with the programme, 
and the fraction of unemployed in activation programmes. The latter may also, from an individual 
perspective, be seen as the probability of being requested to participate in the workfare programme 
or its (expected) duration. The two dimensions turn out to have different implications.  
 
                                                 
6 Defined to belong to the unit interval. A value of 1 corresponds to fully centralized and 0 to fully decentralized 
bargaining.   15
Individuals in the labour market can be divided into three groups, namely, employed, unemployed 
and unemployed in activation. Workfare policies in both its dimensions affect all three groups, and 
we take them in turn. 
 
It is obvious that workfare policies directly affect unemployed in activation, and therefore this 
theme has traditionally been most in focus. A key effect is that the work requirement may crowd out 
ordinary job search; that is, the larger the work requirement is in terms of e.g. hours per week, the 
less time or effort would be left for job search. This is the so-called locking-in effect which is 
detrimental to job creation. This may be countered by a potential post-programme effect to the 
extent that participation in the programme improves human capital and therefore job prospects after 
completion of the programme. 
 
The unemployed who are not in activation are also affected by workfare policies since they may be 
requested to participate in activation programmes to remain eligible for benefits. The possible future 
transition from unemployment to activation may induce them to search more intensively for a job, 
and to lower their reservation demands for the type of jobs (job tasks, location, employer etc.) they 
are willing to accept. This can be phrased in the way that the threat of being required to participate 
in an activation programme motivates the unemployed to search more actively for a job, and hence 
this threat/motivation effect is conducive to job creation. The threat effect depends both on the work 
requirement in the activation programme and on the probability of being required to participate in 
activation. Workfare can thus be thought of as a time-dependence in the benefit scheme or a 
stochastic change in the conditions (penalty) for claiming benefits, and to the extent that 
unemployed find this less attractive than unconditional access to benefits, it follows that search 
intensity increases. 
 
Summing up on the search effects of workfare, it consists of both a possible negative locking-in 
effect of the activated and a positive threat/motivation effect for the unemployed. The net effect on 
search intensity among those without a job is thus theoretically ambiguous, and it is an empirical 
issue which effect dominates. Most empirical assessments of workfare policies have focus on the 
search effects (and post-programme effects), and the theoretical analysis suggests that these effects 
may be ambiguous, which, in turn, explains why many observers are sceptical as to whether 
workfare would significantly affect labour market outcomes. 
 
The employed are also affected by workfare policies. The effect is indirect and arises from the fact 
that employed may lose their job, and if unemployed, they are affected by workfare policies. The 
outside option or alternative for the employed if out of job becomes less attractive, and this will 
under very general assumptions imply that wage demands are moderated. Wage moderation is 
conducive to job creation and therefore in equilibrium increases the job-finding rate. 
 
The presence of the wage effect is important for the effects of workfare policies, not least for 
empirical evaluations of workfare policies. Figure 12 illustrates the interaction between the different 
mechanisms outlined above by means of the model analysed in Andersen and Svarer (2007). The 
figure illustrates how key variables depend on the work requirement of workfare programmes. 
Figure 12a shows search effort for the activated and the unemployed, and it is seen that there is a 
locking-in effect for the former group and a threat effect for the latter, in accordance with the 
reasoning above. Total search effort is displayed in Figure 12b and is almost constant due to the 
counteracting locking-in and threat effects. The figure also displays job creation (vacancies) which 
are increasing due to wage moderation, cf. Figure 12c. The implication is that unemployment falls   16
both when considering registered unemployment (unemployed not in activation) and total 
unemployment including those in activation, cf. Figure 12d. Observe that the figure does not – but 
the model does – take into account the resources used in workfare policies, and hence even though 
unemployment falls, there may be a reduction in overall consumption possibilities due to implied 
tax increases. 
 
















Note: Based on simulations of of theoretical model. 
Source: Andersen and Svarer (2007). 
 
It is an implication of Figure 12 that judging the effects of workfare policies solely from empirical 
analysis of search behaviour or the number of agents in activation may be misleading indicators of 
the effects workfare policies have on overall labour market performance. 
 
The stylized theoretical considerations also point to the fact that the composition of workfare 
policies in terms of work requirement and incidence may play an important role. Having few in a 
workfare programme with a high work requirement may not contribute as much to bringing down 
unemployment as a policy with a smaller work requirement but a higher incidence. The reason is 
that the former mainly has a locking-in effect, while the latter releases a stronger threat effect. 
 
There is a further effect of workfare policies not captured above, namely, a screening effect. In a 
passive system with lax conditions for maintaining eligibility for benefits, some may claim benefits 
without being interested in finding a job, e.g. because they work in the shadow economy or because 
they enjoy non-market activities/leisure. The work requirement implied by workfare implies that it 
becomes less attractive for non-job seekers to claim benefits, and as a consequence, they may either   17
leave the labour force or become genuine job seekers. The screening effect thus implies that 
transfers are better targeted to non-employed job seekers (Besley and Coate (1992)). 
 
A number of important points for policy design can be derived from the preceding considerations. 
Workfare has here been considered as a condition to remain eligible for benefits rather than an 
option to prolong the benefit period, cf. Figure 11 above. In the latter case, the effects – especially 
the wage effect – may easily be reversed. Crowding out may also arise if workfare is considered as 
a “job option” on par with regular jobs. Evaluations of active labour market policies in Sweden 
point to the crowding out mechanisms which can arise in these cases (see e.g. Calmfors, Forslund 
and Hemström (2004)). Similar issues arise if the scheme includes employment subsidies, and thus 
the question of whether regular jobs are crowded out (see e.g. Kangasharju (2007)). In this respect, 
it is important to note that labour market policies in Denmark have shifted from a passive focus on 
income maintenance to a more active focus on employment and job search. 
 
The reasoning above has the important implication that labour market incentives can be 
strengthened via workfare policies. Under a binding distributional constraint in a welfare state, this 
may be a more attractive route by which to reduce unemployment than a reduction in benefits. A 
“utilitarist” would argue that this is a deception since to any workfare requirement there is a benefit 
reduction which leaves the unemployed with the same utility level. Hence, in utility terms, no extra 
degree of freedom is gained in economic policy by use of workfare policies as an alternative to 
benefit reductions. This is not quite that simple since workfare affects the utility of employed, 
unemployed and the activated in different ways, and therefore there is not a one-to-one relation 
between benefits and workfare requirements for the three groups. This is, however, a subtle 
argument. More important politically, is the fact that income or consumption possibilities are 
pivotal in discussions on distribution, whereas utility is not. This partly reflects that income is 
measurable and inter-personally comparable, while utility is not. Moreover, as noted above, in a 
society with a strong work ethic and employment focus, it is not problematic politically to ask 
people to do something in return for support, whereas it may be so to reduce the support to those 
without a job. 
 
Finally, note that the effects of workfare policies on unemployment should be seen relative to the 
resources going into administration and programme activities. These resources have to be financed 
via taxes with distortionary effects. Hence, a reduction in unemployment – open and total – may be 
achieved at a too high cost. We return to this question in Section 6. 
 
5.2.  Workfare in practice 
 
The emphasis on workfare elements in unemployment insurance and social policies have implied 
that active labour market policies are used much more intensively. Various forms of active labour 
market programmes were also used prior to the reform, but with the main purpose of allowing 
participants to re-qualify for a new benefit period. The more active use of active labour market 
policies both as an indirect job search test and to improve job prospects implied a large increase in 
active labour market policies. 
 
For the period 1986-93, average costs of active labour market policies constituted 0.9 % of GDP, 
and for the period 1994-2004, it has been 1.3 % of GDP. The increase reflects both that the costs 
per activated have risen, cf. Figure 13a, since more expensive forms of activation like education   18
have been used more extensively, and also that a larger number of unemployed have been 
participating in activation programmes, cf. Figure 13b. 
 
Figure 13: Activation – Costs and extent 
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Note: Costs are average cost on active labour market programmes per activated. Activation rate is calculated as number of activated relative to 
number of unemployed. A consistent series for the activation rate does not exist prior to 1995. 
Source: Calculated on the basis of data from various editions of OECD Employment Outlook and from data from Statistics Denmark. 
 
Activation requirements apply to unemployed if they are entitled to unemployment insurance, or if 
they receive social benefits. However, the activation requirements are different (and have changed 
over the years). The main principle is that an activation offer should be given no later than after 12 
months unemployment (after 13 weeks if age is below 30), and a new offer should then be given 
after each 6-month period. The extent of activation differs both by age and across insured and non-
insured. The non-insured receiving social assistance who are considered employable are activated 
more often than the insured.  
 





















































Note: Activation rates are calculated on the basis of full-time equivalents relative to the group of unemployed with unemployment insurance, and the 
group receiving social assistance, respectively. 
Source: Arbejdsmarkedsstyrelsen   19
 
The most common type of activation is education, cf. Table 1, although its importance has been 
reduced somewhat in recent years where job training and other forms of activation have increased 
in importance. The average duration of an activation activity is close to 6 months for job training, 
and a little less for other forms of activation. 
 
Table  1: Activation types and duration 
  1995 1998 2001 2003 
Activated  54.460 56.040 59.490 62.760 
                                               --------------------------------------%------------------------------------------ 
Activation type      
  Private job training  13  10  7  9 
    Public  job  training 33 17 13 16 
    Education  33 56 69 52 
    Other  20 18 11 23 
                                               -------------------------------------weeks--------------------------------------- 
D u r a t i o n       
    Private  job  training 26 23 25 27 
    Public  job  training 34 36 30 26 
    Education  23 21 18 17 
    Other  56 32 19 18 
Note: Duration is the average duration of both completed and non-completed activation programmes. “Other” includes intensified job search, specific 
designed projects etc. For 2003, the data applies to the period July 1
st 2003 to June 30
th 2004. 
Source: Danish Economic Council (2007) 
 
5.3.   Empirical evidence  
 
Following the increased use of active labour market programmes in the past decades, there has been 
an increased interest in evaluating the effectiveness of these programmes in terms of bringing 
unemployed closer to the labour market and also to enhance their level of productivity, which 
should result in higher wages and more stable employment trajectories. The empirical literature has 
primarily been focused on the immediate effects of active labour market programmes, but recently, 
there has also been a raise in the number of analyses of long-term effects of active labour market 
programmes.  
 
The main effects of workfare policies have been discussed in Section 5.1. When discussing the 
empirical evidence, it is useful to distinguish between the effects directly affecting the unemployed 
and the general equilibrium effects. The former relates to the threat, locking-in and post-programme 
effects, while the latter mainly relates to the wage effect. We consider the empirical evidence on 
these in turn. 
 
Does participation in workfare programmes enhance job finding rates? 
As mentioned above, there are several potential effects of activation on unemployment. As 
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Figure 15: The effects of workfare on the job finding rate 
 
 
Figure 15 illustrates the three effects in terms of a hazard rate analysis where the hazard rate gives 
the instantaneous probability of leaving unemployment at a given point of elapsed unemployment 
duration. As shown, the potential for workfare to lower the duration of unemployment requires that  
potential positive threat- and post-programme effects dominate a potential negative locking-in 
effect. 
 
Locking-in and post-programme effects 
 
There have been numerous investigations of especially the locking-in and the post-programme 
effects of the active labour market policy in Denmark as well as internationally. The conclusion of 
the international literature is that the job creation effects of the system are questionable (see e.g. 
Heckman et al. (1999) and Kluve (2006)). Similar findings are found in Denmark. In relation to 
most activation programmes, the locking-in effect is quite significant, whereas the post-programme 
effects in most cases are minor, if not absent (see e.g. Skipper and Munch (2007)). The most 
positive effects have been registered for private job training.  
 
Threat/motivation effects 
While it is natural in the first place to focus on the direct effects of workfare policies on those in the 
programmes, subsequent work has pointed to the importance of considering the effects ex ante to 
possible entry into the programme, i.e. the threat/motivation effect discussed above.  
 
In an influential study, Black et al. (2003) find, based on an experimental design, that active labour 
market programmes in the US reduce mean weeks of UI benefit receipt by about 2.2 weeks, that 
they reduce mean UI benefits received by about $143, and that they increase subsequent earnings by 
over $1,050. Most, but not all, of the effects result from a sharp increase in early UI exits in the 
treatment group relative to the control group. These exits coincide with claimants finding out about 











Participation period   21
This article inspired several studies based on Danish data. Geerdsen (2006) exploits legislative 
changes in the duration of benefit periods to identify threat effects. In Figure 10 we showed how the 
so-called passive period has been shortened through the 1990s. Geerdsen (2006) finds that moving 
the active period forward affects the transition rate from unemployment to employment in a positive 
direction. This effect is large and is even comparable in size to the effect of benefits exhaustion 
found in studies of American UI systems. In Figure 16, it is shown how the exit rate from 
unemployment to employment is affected by the change in legislation. 
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Source: Geerdsen (2006) 
 
In a related study, Rosholm and Svarer (2004) consider the threat effects and the locking-in/post-
programme effect simultaneously. Specifically, they allow the individual risk of being activated to 
have a direct effect on the exit rate from unemployment, and they find, especially for men, that the 
risk of being activated significantly increases the job finding rate. On average, the unemployment 
period for men is reduced by around 3 weeks, or by approximately 10 %. 
One disadvantage of studies of the type referred above is that they rely on non-experimental data, 
and as a consequence, these studies need rather strict identifying assumptions to generate 
appropriate control and treatment groups. Interestingly, the Danish Labour Market Authority has 
recently implemented a controlled experiment in two Danish counties. In the period from November 
2005 to March 2006, all newly registered unemployed were split into two groups depending on their 
birthday. All who were born from the 1
st to the 16
th in a given month constituted the treatment 
group, the rest the control group. The control group followed the going rules in the labour market, 
whereas the treatment group were exposed to an intensified sequence of monitoring, counselling, 
job search assistance and mandatory programme participation. The sequence of activities for the 
treatment group can be seen in Figure 17. 
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Figure 17: Sequence of activities for treatment group 
 
Source: Danish Economic Council (2007)  
 
Both Graversen & van Ours (2006) and Rosholm (2007) have evaluated the experiment. They find 
significantly higher job finding rates for the treatment group, which can be attributed to the fact that 
they have to attend more meetings and face the risk of activation earlier during the unemployment 
spell than the control group. Rosholm (2007) does not find any evidence that participating in job 
search assistance or other active labour market programmes help unemployed back to work. 
 
Empirical evidence for Denmark confirms that threat effects are present and also quantitatively 
important. However, the substitution and displacement effects of active labour market programmes 
have not been systematically investigated. Also, internationally the empirical evidence is rather 
modest on these issues. A recent attempt on Finish data shows that firms who hire subsidized labour 
experience a real increase in total employment, and firms in the same industry do not seem to suffer 
from their potential competitive disadvantage (Kangasharju (2007)). This suggests that substitution- 
and displacement effects are not a major issue, but clearly more research in this area is needed 
before any firm conclusions can be drawn. 
 
Are there effects to be found in the long run? 
Recently, more focus has been directed at the long-term effects of active labour market 
programmes. As we argue later in this article, it could very well be the case that workfare 
programmes help unemployed getting closer to employment and hence reduce the risk that they 
become long-term recipients of public support. There are by now a substantial literature that has 
shown that welfare dependency today increases the risk of welfare dependency tomorrow (see e.g. 
Prowse (2005)). This implies that the long-term benefits of workfare policies are potentially large if 
they succeed in minimizing the number of unemployed being trapped in welfare dependency. 
 
Long-term evaluations obviously require micro data that follow individuals for a number of years 
after participation in workfare programmes. Lechner et al. (2006) exploit data from West Germany 
to estimate short- and long-term effects of government-sponsored training programmes. They find – 
in line with the literature cited above – a negative employment effect in the short-run for all 
programmes. However, in the longer run, they find that most programmes seem to increase 
employment rates by about 10 percentage points. In essence, it takes time before the post-
programme effects come to dominate the locking-in effect. 
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The German findings are more or less corroborated in a recent Danish investigation by the Danish 
Economic Council (2007). Here, long-term effects of four different types of programmes are 
investigated in terms of subsequent employment rates and wages. Again, the short-term effects are 
negative, but for several of the programmes both employment rates and wages are positively 
affected by participation in especially private job training and other programmes than education and 
public job training. 
 
The cited studies suggest that a potential long-term effect of workfare policies is to minimize the 
risk of welfare dependency for individuals, and therefore, in turn, the fraction of unemployed being 
permanently dependent on transfers. More research is needed on this before firm conclusions can be 
drawn on the quantitative implications of this mechanism. 
 
Wage effects 
Including workfare requirements among the eligibility conditions for benefits imply that the outside 
option for employed workers becomes less attractive. A large class of wage bargaining models 
predict that this will tend to lower wage demands, i.e. the mark-up of wages over benefits is 
reduced, and this wage effect will, in turn, be conducive to employment. We expect this effect to be 
strongest in the lower end of the wage distribution for two reasons. First, unemployment risks are in 
general higher for this group, and therefore unemployment benefits and the conditions attached to 
them matter more for this group. Second, since the Danish unemployment benefits are determined 
both by an absolute maximum and as a percentage of past income, it follows that the replacement 
ratio is declining in income, cf. Figure 8, and therefore the largest incentive effect is expected for 
groups with high replacement rates. 
 
To evaluate whether there is such a supply side effect we consider both wages and employment for 
low wage groups. A necessary condition for this supply side effect to be present is that there is both 
a downward pressure on wage setting and an upward move in employment. To assess the wage 
effect, we present in Figure 18 the ratio of wages in the lower end of the wage distribution (decile 
10) to the absolute benefit maximum. It is seen that during the 1980s there was an upward trend in 
this ratio despite a high unemployment level. The upward trend was broken in the 1990s despite the 
significant reduction in unemployment. This is suggestive that the labour market reforms have had a 
direct effect on wage formation. A similar tendency is found for higher wage levels, but it is 
strongest in the lower end of the wage distribution as should also a priori be expected.   24



















































Notes: Calculated as the hourly wage for decile 10 in the wage distribution. There is a break in calculation of hourly wages, which implies a drop in 
the wages from 1992 to 1993. We have corrected the wages so that hourly wages after 1992 are comparable to wages prior to this year. 
Source: Own calculations based on data from register data from Statistics Denmark. 
 
 
The finding of Figure 18 suggests that part of the employment increase should be found in the lower 
end of the wage distribution, and thus that it is possibly driven by the workfare policies. To assess 
whether this is the case, we have considered the wage distribution year by year to see where in the 
distribution most employment growth takes place. We use 1990 (pre reform) as the base year and 
compare it to the wage distribution for all subsequent years (corrected for average wage growth 
between the years). If the wage distribution in a subsequent year has more mass over a given 
income interval, it follows that most of the employment growth has been concentrated in this 
income interval. Figure 19 shows one such comparison for 1996 relative to 1990, and it is seen that 
the wage distribution in 1996 has much more mass at the lower end than in 1990, i.e. in comparing 
employment in the two years, one finds relatively more employment in the lower end of the income 
distribution in 1996 compared to 1990. This is consistent with the finding above on the wage mark-
up. 
 


































Note: The wages are hourly wages for the total Danish working population. 
Source: Own calculations based on register data from Statistics Denmark. 
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The fact that wage formation has been affected is also seen from macro wage relations. During the 
reform period, the most widely used wage relations for business cycle forecasting systematically 
overpredicted wage increases (see e.g. Andersen (2006)). An indication of the changes is seen from 
the Phillips curves shown in Figure 21 comparing two periods 1981-1992 and 1993-2005, where it 
is noted that both periods include a booming economy with strong growth in domestic demand. 
Since over the period there is a substantial difference in inflation due to the disinflationary policy, 
the Phillips curve is shown both in the standard form relating nominal wage increases to 
unemployment, and in a real version where real wage growth is related to unemployment. The 
former can be interpreted as being based on “naïve” expectations assuming price inflation to be 
zero, and the latter as being based on “forward looking” expectations in the sense that actual price 
increases are perceived. In this way, the two versions of the Phillips curve span different 
expectations assumptions over the disinflationary period, and in either case, it is seen that there is a 
significant shift in the Phillips curve in the sense that it both shifts inwards and becomes flatter. 
Based on the real-version of the Phillips curve, the rate of unemployment consistent with real wage 
growth of 2 % (equal the trend growth in productivity) has fallen from about 7 % to 4 % between 
the two periods. While suggestive, the macro wage relations suffer from the problem that the effects 
of reforms cannot be captured in some simple time series, and hence the inference has to be 
indirect. Finally, it should be noted that the finding of “more flat Phillips curves” is not a particular 
Danish phenomenon, but is experienced in many countries (see e.g. OECD (2007)). In addition to 
changes in labour market policies, possible explanations include more decentralized wage formation 
and various effects of globalization. A more elaborate empirical investigation of the main 
determinants of the changes in the wage distribution is beyond the scope of this article, but is indeed 
a promising research area for future work. 
 
Figure 20: Phillips curves: Nominal and real, 1981-1992 vs. 1993-2005 
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Source: Own calculations based on data from Statistic Denmark 
 
Finally, it should be noted that the preceding discussion has entirely focussed on assessing the 
effects of workfare policies since they have been central to the Danish policy shift. However, as 
noted above, the policy shift also included other elements including a shortening of the benefit 
duration and tighter eligibility rules for claiming unemployment benefits. A large empirical 
literature has documented the role of unemployment insurance for unemployment (see e.g. Lalive et 
al. (2006)), and these changes are therefore also important in accounting for the shifts in the Danish 
labour market performance. 
   26
7.  Workfare – is it worthwhile? 
 
Workfare policies are costly both in terms of administration and programme costs. Given the 
extensive use of workfare policies in Denmark, it is no surprise that the resource use on active 
labour market policies is among the highest in OECD, constituting about 1.3 % of GDP. This raises 
the question of whether the effects of workfare policies are worth the resources. 
 
A few attempts have been made at making a cost-benefit analysis of the activation policies (see 
Danish Economic Council (2007)). The overall conclusion is that the costs exceed the benefit by 
about 50.000 DKK (6.800 EURO) per year per activated when including the locking-in, post-
programme and motivation effects. However, considering the various forms of activation, it is 
found that job training (in particular private) has benefits exceeding its costs, while this is not the 
case for education and other forms of activation. 
 
Cost-benefit analyses in their standard form suffer from some problems. First, they are very 
sensitive to the effects which it has not been possible to quantify. In e.g. the cost-benefit analysis 
referred to above, the wage effect is not included. Second, the use of activation policies, such as 
benefit reductions, rather than other means to reduce unemployment is in the first place motivated 
by distributional considerations, and therefore an evaluation of the policy outcome must take these 
considerations into account. Finally, dynamic effects and possible state dependencies are difficult to 
capture. 
 
To assess the orders of magnitudes involved, we propose a very simple and yet informative 
approach by asking how large the employment gains from workfare policies need to be to justify the 
costs, i.e. how large should the employment gain be such that the policy in net terms is not a burden 
on public finances. A proper analysis of this question would require a calibrated general equilibrium 
model which it not at hand. Instead, we take an indirect (partial) approach and calculate how much 
extra employment workfare policies should generate for achieving a break even for public finances. 
In this, we take into account that increased employment improves public finances via both increased 
tax payments generated by the increase in income and reduced expenditures on transfers. In net 
terms this effect is rather strong in Denmark due to the extended welfare state (high taxes, high 
income transfers). With total costs of workfare policies constituting about 1.3 % of GDP, we find 
that the needed employment effect is about 90.000 persons, or a 3 % increase in employment
7. Seen 
relative to available micro-evidence, cf. above, this seems to suggest that the policy has not 
achieved breakeven. However, there are two arguments why the effects of workfare policies may be 
more favourable than suggested above.  First, the problem is a second-best problem and resources 
were used on workfare policies already before the reforms in the 1990s, and hence the question is 
whether the reforms have improved the situation. Resources on labour market policies were on 
average 0.9 of GDP before the reforms, and about 1.3 % after the reforms. Hence, the reforms 
increased expenditures by about 0.4 % of GDP which only requires an employment increase of 
about 20.000 or almost 1 % to reach breakeven.  This suggests that the policy reforms have 
contributed to relieve the pressure on public finances. Second, to the extent that state dependence is 
important in the labour market, the procedure above – and standard cost-benefit analyses – suffer 
from the problem that they take a static approach overlooking the dynamic implications of workfare 
                                                 
7 Calculations are based on costs of active labour market policies as reported by the OECD, and the marginal budget 
effect of bringing one unemployed into employment given current tax and benefit rules as calculated by the Danish 
Welfare Commission (2006).   27
policies in bringing more people closer to the labour market and thereby preventing labour market 
exclusion. As an illustration of the quantitative importance of this, note that taking a purely static 
perspective it is required that 50 % of the activated become employed to reach breakeven on public 
budgets, while if there is state dependence, then over a say 10-year perspective workfare should 
raise employment probabilities by less than 10 % each year. 
 
The findings above suggest that the shift in labour market policies have improved the cost-
effectiveness ratio relative to past policies, but also that an issue of cost-effectiveness remains. The 
challenge is to design programmes that increase the chances of employment the most, which, in 
turn, raises questions of both programme design and allocation of unemployed to appropriate 
programmes. An important question is whether the policy can be refined so as to achieve the same 
or better employment effects at lower costs. These issues have been much in focus in recent years, 
and we briefly discuss three elements: sanctions, targeting and matching. 
 
Sanctions and Matching  
 
The effectiveness of workfare policies can possibly be enhanced via monitoring and sanctions of 
unemployed. The eligibility criteria include that the public employment service may ask the 
unemployed to accept a given employment opportunity, they may require that the unemployed 
submits and maintains a CV on the internet based job bank, and they may require that the 
unemployed participates in active labour market programmes. If the unemployed does not comply 
with the requirements, his/her UI-fund is notified. The UI-fund can then choose to sanction the 
unemployed by cancelling UI benefit payment for a period of time. Sanctions can also be used to 
strengthen incentives for job search (see e.g. Fredriksson & Holmlund (2005)). 
 
Policies used to be very lax and few were sanctioned. The most recent labour market reforms have 
contained elements that have lead to a strengthening of eligibility criteria. This is also true for the 
2003 reform. Figure 22 reports sanctions before (2002) and after (2004) the reform, and it is seen 
that sanctions have become more prevalent. Another piece of evidence for the increased use of 
sanctions in Denmark is found in Gray (2003). Here, sanction rates for 14 different OECD countries 
in the late 1990s are compared. At that time, Denmark sanctioned 4.3 % of the total stock of 
unemployed. The corresponding number for 2005 is close to 12 % suggesting that the sanction 
intensity indeed has risen in recent years. 
 

























Note: The figure is based on data for all unemployed in the period from 2001-2005 and gives the sanction rate defined as the fraction of individuals 
who are receiving a sanction in a given week of their unemployment spell compared to all individuals with similar spell duration. No reliable time 
series exists on the number of sanctions in Denmark.  
Source: DREAM and AMANDA   28
The key question is whether sanctions affect the transition rate from unemployment to employment. 
Svarer (2007) analyses a large Danish register data set with information on unemployment and 
sanctions for the complete Danish population in the period from January 2003 to November 2005. 
He finds that the exit rate from unemployment to employment increases with more than 50 % for 
both males and females as a consequence of sanctions. Similar results are found for the Netherlands 
(e.g. Abbring et al. (2005)) and for Switzerland (Lalive et al. (2005)). 
 
It is likely that monitoring and sanctions have threat effects. Lalive et al. (2005) exploit differences 
in the intensity at which local public employment service offices monitor and sanction unemployed. 
They find that for public employment office units where the policy is more lax, the unemployed 
spend more time receiving public support. In the Danish context, it is the UI-fund of the 
unemployed that sanctions in response to non-compliance. There are 32 different UI-funds that 
cover different educational groupings and industries. There are remarkably large differences in the 
intensity at which the different UI-funds sanction their members, also when the characteristics of 
their members and the labour market conditions are taken into account. Svarer (2007) investigates 
whether members of more lax UI-funds stay longer in unemployment, and he finds that this is the 
case for males, but not for females. In comparison to the results found in Rosholm & Svarer (2004) 
for the threat effects of active labour market programmes, it is interesting that the threat effects of 
both monitoring and sanctions and active labour market programmes are present for males, but not 
for females. 
 
Targeting and matching 
 
As pointed out in e.g Kluve (2006), effects of active labour market programmes differ across the 
population. In the Danish case, recent findings suggest that low-skilled unemployed exhibit positive 
employment effects of educational training, whereas highly educated do not (Danish Economic 
Council, 2007)). 
 
This suggests that targeting of programmes to unemployed should systematically take into account 
the possible heterogeneous effects they have for different groups. This can be accomplished by use 
of a statistical assistance programme selection tool that assesses which programme (if any) is 
expected to have the best effect in terms of reducing the length of unemployment spells for a 
particular individual with certain personal characteristics. The advantage of basing allocation of 
programmes on statistical tools is that these can exploit the accumulated experience of all previous 
activation spells; something it is hard to imagine a case worker with only a limited number of 
clients can do with equal precision. Currently, targeting programmes are being designed and tested 
in Switzerland (SAPS) and Germany (TrEffeR). In Denmark, Staghøj et al. (2007) are currently 
testing the usefulness of a targeting tool based on historic data. The development and 
implementation of these instruments are still in their infancy. However, a simulation study by 
Lechner and Smith (2007) suggests that the allocation of unemployed to different programmes can 
be improved if the choice is based on the statistical allocation mechanism compared to the 
allocation chosen by case workers. A related issue arises for the group of unemployed receiving 
social assistance where some only have unemployment as their problem, while others have 
additional social and personal problems making immediate transition into employment unlikely. 
Since 2004, recipients of social assistance have been classified in one of few so-called match groups 
according to the extent to which their abilities and characteristics make job finding likely or 
unlikely. Recipients in match groups making job finding likely are required to sign up in job-centres   29
as actively searching for jobs. Activation requirements are also larger for this group since they 
should have a new offer no later than 6 months after having ended the previous offer. 
 
7. Future  challenges 
 
Flexible hiring and firing rules are conducive to adjustment and change, and generous social 
security systems lower individual risk via collective risk sharing reducing worker opposition to 
change and adjustment. The Danish experience shows that this model is not automatically leading 
to low unemployment. On the contrary, changes in the labour market may cause unemployment, 
and the transfers offered by the welfare state may become an absorbing state. Essentially, this is a 
variant of the well-known finding that if there is a passive player in a tripartite relation, the passive 
player ends up carrying all the costs. This was the case in Denmark from the mid of the 1970s to the 
mid of the 1990s with high and persistent unemployment and a growing “transfer” obligation on the 
par of the welfare state. The Danish experience also shows that when the third leg of the model 
came to take a more active rather than passive role in the sense of not only providing income 
support but also focusing on job search and employment, the model came to function better. 
Unemployment has been reduced dramatically, although there still is an issue with respect to 
reducing the transfer burden further. 
 
The Danish labour market development since the mid-1990s with a significant reduction in 
unemployment is remarkable since it has achieved great results without taking resort to general 
benefit reductions. This shows that it is possible to improve incentives in the labour market without 
taking resort to benefit reductions and the like. The pivotal elements are the activation policies and 
the shortening of the benefit period both directly by shortening benefit duration, and indirectly via 
the conditions arising from activation. However, these changes have not come without costs since 
the active labour market policies are resource demanding. This is a second-best issue since the 
resource use was already large before the change towards a more active policy, and seen in this 
perspective, the policy has been an improvement, although there is scope for improving the cost-
effectiveness ratio. Whether the policy in absolute net terms has improved the trade-off between 
efficiency and distribution is an open issue, but judged from revealed preferences in policy debates, 
it seems to be the case. 
 
In addition to the cost implications, there are other important policy dilemmas associated with the 
activation policy. The first is the screening paradox related to activation requirements. To the extent 
that this policy works, the consequence may be that those actually ending up in activation are the 
groups with severe problems in terms of meeting the requirements to obtain a job at given wage 
levels (low ability groups), while the stronger groups have left the system. Hence, it may seem as if 
the policy does not work (those on activation do not get jobs) and activation accomplishes nothing 
but punishing weak groups. Another dilemma is that with a binding distributional constraint it 
inevitable follows that labour demand falls short of labour supply, and hence it may seem pointless 
to focus so much on job search for these groups. This view is problematic since even in the 
presence of unemployment, it does not follow that employment is invariant to changes on the 
supply side (more job search, changed wage setting). Moreover, there is a dynamic aspect to this 
since slack job search criteria may imply that labour supply eventually comes to constrain demand, 
in particular if human capital depreciates over time. Finally, the political support to the policy 
stance is likely to be very business cycle dependent. In a recession with increasing unemployment, 
there is a risk that it will be difficult to maintain support for the active line in labour market policies.   30
Already during the mild recession in 2001-03, it was voiced that the active approach could be 
relaxed since there was a decline in the need for labour. 
 
Can the Danish flexicurity model be exported? As the preceding discussion has shown the Danish 
experience is the product of a historic process and policy changes involving complementarities 
between the three main ingredients of the Danish labour market model. Hence, the answer is 
basically no. There are, however, lessons from the Danish experience, both from the failures during 
the 1970s and 1980s, and the more successful changes in labour market policies since the early part 
of the 1990s. This development shows that it is possible to improve labour market performance by 
policies taking a direct approach in strengthening incentives for job search and creation. 
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